In a bold move earlier this year, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent unveiled the Trump administration’s “3-3-3” economic strategy, a plan that aims to achieve 3% annual real GDP growth, slash the federal budget deficit from 7% to 3% of GDP, and boost domestic oil production by 3 million barrels per day. The policy is rooted in Trump’s long-held “drill, baby, drill” ethos.
However, economic and energy experts have cast doubt on the feasibility of these targets. Despite a regulatory environment favorable to fossil fuels, analysts warn that U.S. oil production is likely to stagnate—or even decline—as energy companies prioritize shareholder returns over aggressive output growth.
Early indicators suggest that the administration’s lofty energy goals are already off course.
Multiple metrics now point to a looming downturn in U.S. crude oil output, beginning in Trump’s first year back in office. While many 2025 shale programs are already funded and underway, energy analysts warn that 2026 development plans are under threat due to persistently low oil prices. According to Standard Chartered, U.S. crude oil supply is projected to fall by 158,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2025 and by 183,000 bpd in 2026—marking a reversal of the production growth seen under the Biden administration.
The bank’s forecast is based on four key industry indicators.
Firstly, production data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) paints a subdued picture. In March, U.S. crude production reached a record 13.488 million bpd, marginally higher than the December 2024 peak of 13.458 million bpd. This modest increase of just 30,000 bpd over three months stands in stark contrast to the 270,000 bpd added in 2024.
The EIA, typically optimistic, has revised its projections to anticipate U.S. crude output reaching only 14 million bpd by 2027—far short of Bessent’s ambitions.
Secondly, the ongoing decline in the U.S. oil rig count shows no signs of slowing. According to Baker Hughes, the number of active oil rigs has dropped by 41 so far this year and 50 year-over-year. While some of this decline can be attributed to gains in drilling efficiency, Standard Chartered notes that this downward trend has persisted for 30 months.
Thirdly, the frac spread count—an important indicator of well completion activity—has fallen sharply to 186, a significant drop from the post-COVID high of 300 spreads in November 2022. This suggests a broader slowdown in hydraulic fracturing operations, even amid technical improvements.
Finally, the number of drilled but uncompleted (DUC) wells—an indicator of producers’ willingness to bring wells online—has plummeted to 4,494 as of February 2025, half the number recorded at the pandemic peak in June 2020. While the count has recently stabilized, the sharp decline suggests caution in production planning.
The broader economic context offers little comfort. The U.S. shale sector remains vulnerable to global market pressures, including potential price wars initiated by Saudi Arabia and OPEC+. According to a March survey by the Dallas Federal Reserve, most U.S. shale producers require West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude prices of at least $65 per barrel to remain profitable. Compounding the issue, tariffs on steel imports have driven up the cost of fracking equipment, and geological challenges are becoming more pronounced as the nearly 20-year-old shale boom reaches maturity.
Investment firm Goehring & Rozencwajg describes the situation as a “Depletion Paradox,” where even rising prices cannot overcome the physical limits of U.S. oil fields.
There is still hope among energy bulls that technological innovation could reverse the downward trend. Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), particularly through the use of carbon dioxide injection, holds potential for revitalizing aging wells. Under the previous administration, the Department of Energy explored advanced CO₂-EOR techniques that could potentially unlock an estimated 60 billion barrels of otherwise inaccessible oil—equivalent to more than a decade of current U.S. output.
While these innovations may offer long-term promise, they are unlikely to deliver the rapid production surge the Trump administration envisions. For now, the data suggests that the road to achieving the “3-3-3” energy goal will be far more arduous than advertised.
